This is the first complete edition of the Chronicon Anonymi Cantuariensis, a contemporary narrative that provides valuable insights into medieval war and diplomacy, written at Canterbury shortly after the mid-fourteenth century. The previous edition, published in 1914, was based on a manuscript from which the text for the years 1357 to 1364 was missing. Presented here in full with a modern English translation, the chronicle provides a key narrative of military and political events covering the years from 1346 to 1365. (...) Concentrating principally on the campaigns of the Hundred Years War and their impact upon the inhabitants of south-east England, the author took advantage of his position on the main news route between London and Paris to provide a detailed account of a crucial phase in British and European history. (shrink)

On August 30, 2013, the American Political Science Association sponsored a roundtable on political epistemology as part of its annual meetings. Co-chairing the roundtable were Jeffrey Friedman, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin; and Hélène Landemore, Department of Political Science, Yale University. The other participants were Scott Althaus, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Mark Bevir, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley; Rogers Smith, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; and (...) Susan Stokes, Department of Political Science, Yale University. We thank the participants for permission to republish their remarks, which they subsequently edited for clarity. (shrink)

Charity Scott was a professor of health law at Georgia State University College of Law, the founding director of the College of Law’s Center for Law, Health, and Society, and co-founder of the Health Law Partnership (HeLP) at Georgia State. She is an iconic figure in her adopted hometown of Atlanta and certainly one of the most important scholars in the history of the health law field, justly celebrated for her teaching, her innovation, her commitment to interdisciplinary work, (...) and for her compassion and love for others. She was also a dear friend of mine. In this short essay I will reflect on my friendship with Charity and her involvement with the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, the publisher of this journal. (shrink)

This concluding essay offers reflections on core components of the faculty fellowship program, its outcomes and results, and program design and administration. Amid the current calls for reform in legal and other professional education, the lessons we learned and perspectives we gained during this fellowship program may be relevant to any faculty members and university administrations that are seeking to create more effective and engaged professional and graduate school programs, whatever may be their subject-matter discipline.

Charity Scott brought health law to Georgia State College of Law in the fall of 1987. Through her faculty appointment, along with her boundless energy and intellectual curiosity, she set herself on an odyssey. She began by teaching a single general health law class. This beginning led to the development of a full curriculum in the field, complete with experiential learning opportunities and a certificate in health law program. In addition to creating learning and career opportunities in health (...) law for law students, her development of the Center for Health, Law and Society created academic opportunities for leading health law faculty. (shrink)

In 2006, the University of Maryland Carey School of Law had the privilege of co-hosting the annual Health Law Professors Conference with the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME). Coincidentally, as director of the Law & Health Care Program at Maryland, I had the opportunity to announce the winner of the Jay Healey Health Law Teachers’ Award at the conference. The award is given to “professors who have devoted a significant portion of their career to health law teaching (...) and whose selection would honor Jay [Healey’s] legacy through their passion for teaching health law, their mentoring of students and/or other faculty and by their being an inspiration to colleagues and students.”1 Healey, a Professor in the Humanities Department at the University of Connecticut School of Medicine, was the youngest recipient of the Society’s Health Law Teachers’ Award, which he received in 1990. He was passionate about teaching and had the idea to devote a session each year at the annual conference to teaching health law. It was always a plenary session at which he challenged us to be better teachers. Jay died in 1993, at the age of 46, not long after the Health Law Teachers conference that year, which he attended and which also happened to be held in Baltimore at the University of Maryland School of Law. Thereafter, the award was given in his name. (shrink)

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

This is how Georgia State University College of Law Professor Charity Scott introduced the concept of mindfulness to numerous law students and lawyers. Aware that her skeptical, mind-driven audience needed a clear definition for a practice that seemed curious, at best, and esoteric, at worst, she immediately gave us the very lawyerly task of “pars[ing] each of these phrases to understand their importance and relevance to the legal profession”2 and applying them to our own experience of studying or (...) practicing law. Using scientific evidence, she described the benefits of mindfulness and then invited us to try it and decide for ourselves. Charity was a superb teacher, who knew how to impart knowledge skillfully, and a brilliant lawyer, who could present and defend her case exceptionally well. In fact, “Charity Scott owned the subject matter so deeply that she was able to engage lawyers who otherwise would never have given the concept of mindfulness any credence in a million years. In a way that’s hard to describe, she didn’t brook any resistance on the topic and, as a result, was able to move the needle on well-being for lawyers at a time when, as far as I can tell, she was the only one doing the lifting,” reflects Lynn Garson, health care attorney and mental health advocate. But I believe Charity Scott’s true mastery and impact came from her embodiment of mindfulness itself. In her presence, mindfulness ceased to be a mere concept, but instead became her way of being that illuminated her words and actions, nourished her relationships, and changed lives. (shrink)

As Steve Kaminshine said in his comments at the symposium honoring Charity Scott, I was recruited to come to Georgia State University as a “Law and Bioethics” scholar who had spent more than sixteen years shuttling between an office in a hospital and another in a law school. But when I first visited Georgia State Law, I did not know that more than ten years earlier Charity Scott had spent the better part of an academic year (...) living and breathing clinical ethics at Grady Memorial Hospital.1 Because of her usual habit of immersion in all learning experiences, in that year Charity gained more insight into how hospitals work and how physicians behave when they are knee deep in their professional milieu of life and death decision-making than many full-time bioethics academics do in a career. For the rest of her career Charity kept one foot well planted in the medical context, as an advisor in problems of research ethics, as a teacher in her own medical-legal partnership structured around real-life clinical problems, and as an ethical analyst who could never be accused of mouthing a mantra of phrases, the “vacuous incantation of abstract principles”2 that might pass for bioethics discourse in some circles. (shrink)

It was a privilege to attend the symposium Defining Health Law for the Future, and join with so many of Georgia State University College of Law Professor Emerita Charity Scott’s colleagues and friends, supporters, former students, mentees, and presenters. It was a symposium that fittingly served as a tribute to Charity and the remarkable impact she had on the many communities she touched. To the Harrell/Scott family — thank you so much for helping us celebrate (...) class='Hi'>Charity and her work. (shrink)

It was a great privilege to know Professor Charity Scott. I first met her when I was finishing Emory University’s joint law and public health program in the early 2000s, through the Office of General Counsel at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC), in the early days of CDC’s Public Health Law Program, now the Office of Public Health Law Services. In those days, introductions were generous and frequent for excited students beginning their careers, but meeting Professor (...) Scott made an impression on me. She was the first and only female health law professor in the field that I had the opportunity to know in the early years of my career. (shrink)

Georgia State University College of Law Professor Emerita Charity Scott quoted these words from Albert Einstein in June of 2022 as she concluded a tribute to Professor Joseph (Jay) M. Healey, one of the founding lights of health law and health law teaching. She chose the quote because she thought the words and sentiment would resonate with Jay. I repeat it because Dr. Einstein’s words capture the essence and heart of Charity’s approach to teaching, pedagogy, and life. (...) Charity modeled, urged, nudged, and taught the community of health law professors to embrace imagination and creativity. Charity’s vision has helped us be more creative and reflective teachers.2. (shrink)

This special edition of JLME celebrates the life of Charity Scott, Professor Emerita and Founding Director of the Center for Law, Health & Society at Georgia State University College of Law.

I applied to law school as a means to an end. To “fix the system,” to make a difference, to advocate for meaningful change that improves health and well-being of others. Charity Scott accomplished, in her academic career, what I have not. At least thus far, I have chosen to follow a different path, dipping in and out of my original mission. Charity, by contrast, was focused and centered, never deviating from her integrity, purpose, kindness, advocacy, and (...) brilliance. She gracefully married the intellectual enterprise of legal education with an unwavering mission to improve individual lives — of students, colleagues, clients, practitioners, and public servants. She was among pioneers in the health law field. She pioneered the medical-legal partnership model. She made a difference. (shrink)

Balancing on a tightrope twenty feet above the ground is outside the comfort zones of many health law professors. Being there forces you to consider in new ways yourself, your skills, and your surroundings. Fears arise, and yet you must still act. And you must trust that the person who offered you this opportunity cared about you and your well-being, and that they would ensure there was a way to get from where you began to the other side.

In this paper, the authors argue for two main claims: first, that the epistemic results of group deliberation can be superior to those of individual inquiry; and, second, that successful deliberative groups depend on individuals exhibiting deliberative virtues. The development of these group-deliberative virtues, the authors argue, is important not only for epistemic purposes but political purposes, as democracies require the virtuous deliberation of their citizens. Deliberative virtues contribute to the deliberative synergy of the group, not only in terms of (...) improving the quality of the group's present decisions, but also improving the background conditions for continued group deliberation. The authors sketch a preliminary schedule of these group-deliberative virtues modelled on Aristotle's conception of virtue as the mean between two extreme vices. The virtues discussed in this article include deliberative wit, friendliness, empathy, charity, temperance, courage, sincerity, and humility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PrefaceScott Paeth and Kevin CarnahanThis issue of the Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics is organized around the theme of structural evil. Each of the essays deals with some dimension of the problem of how we can conceive of evil beyond the question of simple human volition, and understand it as embedded in the institutions and cultural assumptions that we often take for granted as societal givens.Cristina Traina's (...) presidential address, "This Is the Year," takes as its starting point the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election, arguing that it exposes the way in which liberal narratives of progress have failed to address the deeply embedded structural evil within American society. She argues that this political moment provides an opportunity for liberals to engage in a critical self-examination with respect to their complicity in these structures by embracing a form of "utopian praxis."Ryan Darr's essay considers the intersection of structural evil and individual responsibility, arguing, on the one hand, for a distinction between sin and moral wrongdoing and, on the other, for an approach to both concepts that is social in form. Esther Reed's essay, meanwhile, offers an analysis of responsibility in light of the question of structural evil, using the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer to aid in understanding the connection between individual responsibility and distant harm.David Cloutier continues the examination of the tension between individual agency and structural evil in his critique of the "neo-Franciscan" and "Junian" approaches to issues of violence and racism, arguing that a "critical realist" approach to structural evil provides greater resources for Christian ethics.Elizabeth Sweeny Block offers a different approach to the question in her consideration of the role of conscience in grappling with crises on a global scale, such as climate change and the Zika virus. She contrasts the "reflexive conscience" predominant in Christian ethics with a model of "engaged conscience," which may provide a better approach to large-scale structural evil and its consequences.Stewart Clem uses Thomas Aquinas's conception of virtue to understand the problems inherent in striving for moral clarity in a "post-truth" context. In [End Page vii] light of Harry Frankfurt's philosophical analysis of the concept of "bullshit," he argues that Christian ethics needs to develop a way of speaking about truth as a virtue in order to respond to the structural problem of truth indifference in contemporary political discourse.Looking at the problem from a different perspective, Christopher Jones and Conor Kelly examine the sin of sloth from a structural point of view. Critiquing individualist conceptions of the idea, they make the case for retrieving the classical definition of sloth as a vice against charity and consider how sloth can be overcome through a reinvigoration of forms of civic virtue.Another dimension of structural evil is considered by Ryan Newson in his examination of the role that Confederate monuments play in the American South. For many, they stand as a symbol of the glorification of evil that should be removed, but Newson suggests that there may be reasons to keep at least some of these monuments as reminders of the failure of justice and the judgment of God.Wonchul Shin and Elizabeth Bounds consider these questions from the perspective of how "ordinary" experiences of moral harm need to be analyzed as dimensions of structural evil, and they call for an examination of structural responsibility and the ethics of repair as a means of addressing these questions.Finally, Willa Swenson-Lengyel looks at the connection between structural evil and environmental ethics, arguing that the "moral paralysis" often experienced in light of the ecological crisis exposes certain forms of privilege that need to be addressed from the perspective of Christian ethics. In many ways, she argues, privileged inaction can be a manifestation of "works righteousness" that can be addressed through a Lutheran conception of the doctrine of justification.________This year the JSCE is retiring the demographic survey that has been used since 2008 and adopting a new demographic survey. With the transition comes an apt time for reflection on what the data from the last nine years show.The first piece of data to... (shrink)

Argumentation occurs through and as communicative activity. Communication is organized by pragmatic principles of expression and interpretation. Grice’s theory of conversational implicature provides a model for how people use rational principles to manage the ways in which they reason to representations of arguments, and not just reason from those representations. These principles are systematic biases that make possible reasonable decision-making and intersubjective understandings in the first place; but they also make possible all manner of errors and abuses. Much of what (...) is problematic in argumentation involves the ways in which the pragmatic principles of communication are exploited and the difficulties audiences and interlocutors have detecting and managing these abuses. (shrink)

People who wish to make direct gifts to charities or other nonprofit organizations are faced with an overwhelming number of choices. There exist several types of sources of information to help potential donors choose whether, where, and how much to give. Each of these has its limitations, and at some point the size of the gift contemplated by the donor can justify the marginal cost of consulting with an advisor, particularly when the donor is already consulting with legal or financial (...) planners for estate or other planning. Fundraisers and nonprofit organizations advocate for advisors to encourage their clients to donate. This raises the questions of the proper role of, and the duties incumbent on, those who counsel potential donors on donations (whether or not such counsel is given in connection with other professional advice). After reviewing the situation that gives rise to these issues, this article discusses answers to these questions and how philanthropy and client service can be furthered as part of the same process. (shrink)

Creativity pervades human life. It is the mark of individuality, the vehicle of self-expression, and the engine of progress in every human endeavor. It also raises a wealth of neglected and yet evocative philosophical questions: What is the role of consciousness in the creative process? How does the audience for a work for art influence its creation? How can creativity emerge through childhood pretending? Do great works of literature give us insight into human nature? Can a computer program really be (...) creative? How do we define creativity in the first place? Is it a virtue? What is the difference between creativity in science and art? Can creativity be taught? The new essays that comprise The Philosophy of Creativity take up these and other key questions and, in doing so, illustrate the value of interdisciplinary exchange. Written by leading philosophers and psychologists involved in studying creativity, the essays integrate philosophical insights with empirical research. CONTENTS I. Introduction Introducing The Philosophy of Creativity Elliot Samuel Paul and Scott Barry Kaufman II. The Concept of Creativity 1. An Experiential Account of Creativity Bence Nanay III. Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art 2. Creativity and Insight Gregory Currie 3. The Creative Audience: Some Ways in which Readers, Viewers and/or Listeners Use their Imaginations to Engage Fictional Artworks Noël Carroll 4. The Products of Musical Creativity Christopher Peacocke IV. Ethics & Value Theory 5. Performing Oneself Owen Flanagan 6. Creativity as a Virtue of Character Matthew Kieran V. Philosophy of Mind & Cognitive Science 7. Creativity and Not So Dumb Luck Simon Blackburn 8. The Role of Imagination in Creativity Dustin Stokes 9. Creativity, Consciousness, and Free Will: Evidence from Psychology Experiments Roy F. Baumeister, Brandon J. Schmeichel, and C. Nathan DeWall 10. The Origins of Creativity Elizabeth Picciuto and Peter Carruthers 11. Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: a Contradiction in Terms? Margaret Boden VI. Philosophy of Science 12. Hierarchies of Creative Domains: Disciplinary Constraints on Blind-Variation and Selective-Retention Dean Keith Simonton VII. Philosophy of Education (& Education of Philosophy) 13. Educating for Creativity Berys Gaut 14. Philosophical Heuristics Alan Hájek. (shrink)

This study addresses the interpretative problem of how Plato ought to be read and orients itself within the debate between Hellenists, on the one hand, who treat the dialogues as works of literary and dramatic art, and philosophers, on the other hand, who concentrate on the arguments and their logic. Stokes argues for a model of interpretation that takes both Plato the philosopher and the dialogue form seriously. He then systematically applies this method to three whole conversations or dialogues: (...) the Laches, the conversation between Socrates and Agathon in the Symposium, and the Protagoras. (shrink)

St. Paul writes, “whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10: 31 NABRE).” This essay employs the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and the recent philosophical work of Daniel Johnson (2020) on this command to investigate a series of questions that the command raises. What is glory? How does one properly act for glory and for the glory of another? How is it possible to do everything for the glory of God? I begin with Aquinas’ (...) account of glory and the pursuit of glory for God’s glory and Aquinas’s answers to some of the above questions that can be drawn from his discussion in De Malo. I defend Aquinas against criticisms from Daniel Johnson and present his own interpretation of the command. I advance the discussion through adding two additional interpretations that do not rely on a controversial assumption Johnson makes. Next, I address the puzzle of how we can intend everything for the glory of God using Aquinas’s three-fold account of intention. Finally, I discuss the relation between charity and the desire for God’s glory and how regular, actual intentions of one’s actions for the glory of God increases charity. (shrink)

This tribute compares Charity Scott to Fred Rogers, highlighting how Charity nurtured health law colleagues’ unique gifts and built community. Continuing the neighborhood theme, it highlights encouraging developments relating to health, housing, and place: Medicaid housing supports and potential reparations for redlining-related health inequities.

Few people in my memory have a name that more appropriately defines the life they have lived. “Charitable purpose” as defined in O.C.G.A. § 43-17-2 includes any charitable or benevolent purpose including health, education, or social welfare. Anyone who knew Charity Scott knows that she lived a life devoted to providing and improving the health of her community, the education of law students about health law and its use to improve the health of her community, and social welfare (...) by addressing the socio-economic determinants of health. If she had not been assigned that name at birth, those of us who knew her could have easily assigned Charity as a nickname. (shrink)

Eutychus Or the Future of the Pulpit Winifred Holtby Originally published in 1928 "Few wittier or wiser books have appeared in this stimulating series." Spectator "…delicious fun." Guardian A dialogue between Archbishop Fénelon, who stands for the great ecclesiastical tradition of preaching, Anthony, who stands for the more superficial intellectual movements in England and Eutychus, the ordinary man, investigates the nature of the pulpit. 134pp Apella or the Future of the Jews A Quarterly Reviewer Originally published in 1925 "Cogent, because (...) of brevity and magnificent prose style…It should not be missed." Spectator "…his arguments are a provocation to fruitful thinking." Morning Post This volume attempts to foresee the future of the Jews across the world, in the light of their previous history, the situation in Russia and the modern developments of Zionism. Inter-marriage, Jewish nationalism, Jewish religion and reform movements are among the subjects discussed. 90pp Vicisti, Galilaee? Or Religion in England: A Survey and a Forecast Edward B Powley Originally published in 1929 "…a book to be read, thought over, and discussed by all Christians who are not afraid to take the shutters down." Guardian Who was Jesus? How did Christianity begin, become orthodox, receive recognition as the state religion of the Roman Empire? What has been the history of Christianity in England? This volume discusses these questions and surveys of state of English churches in the early 20 th century. 114pp Perseus, of Dragons H F Scott Stokes Originally published in 1924 "A diverting little book…both quaint and various." Morning Post This volume gives an account of the dragon in history: in ancient Greece, in early Christendom and in modern Europe and explains how the dragon-story originated from the myths and customs of pre-historic Egypt. The author then maintains that in twentieth century England the dragon is not dead, that the characteristics of respectability, bigotry and cant represent the modern day dragon. 70pp. (shrink)

Examining the establishment of Christianity as a major world religion, Jewish nationalism and the myths and customs of pre-historic Egypt, the volumes in this mini-set, originally published between 1924 and 1929 include work by Winifred Holtby, Edward B Powley and H F Scott Stokes.

With the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and the desire to ensure that such machines work well with humans, it is essential for AI systems to actively model their human teammates, a capability referred to as Machine Theory of Mind (MToM). In this paper, we introduce the inner loop of human–machine teaming expressed as communication with MToM capability. We present three different approaches to MToM: (1) constructing models of human inference with well-validated psychological theories and empirical measurements; (2) modeling human (...) as a copy of the AI; and (3) incorporating well-documented domain knowledge about human behavior into the above two approaches. We offer a formal language for machine communication and MToM, where each term has a clear mechanistic interpretation. We exemplify the overarching formalism and the specific approaches in two concrete example scenarios. Related work that demonstrates these approaches is highlighted along the way. The formalism, examples, and empirical support provide a holistic picture of the inner loop of human–machine teaming as a foundational building block of collective human–machine intelligence. (shrink)

This essay differentiates two approaches to understanding the concept of coercion, and argues for the relative merits of the one currently out of fashion. The approach currently dominant in the philosophical literature treats threats as essential to coercion, and understands coercion in terms of the way threats alter the costs and benefits of an agent’s actions; I call this the “pressure” approach. It has largely superseded the “enforcement approach,” which focuses on the powers and actions of the coercer rather than (...) the perspective of the coercee. The enforcement approach identifies coercion with certain uses of the kinds of powers that agents need to accumulate and wield in order to be able to make significant, credible threats. Though there is considerable overlap extensionally in the instances of coercion recognized by the two approaches, the enforcement approach encompasses some uses of power to coerce that do not involve threats . It also circumscribes which threats should be counted as coercive, though notably it provides a picture of coercion that is non-moralized in its essentials. While there may be specific purposes for which a pressure account is to be preferred, I argue that the enforcement approach better describes how coercion works, and elucidates factors that are often tacitly assumed by pressure accounts. It also is more useful for explaining the social and political significance of coercion, and why coercion is thought to have the implications commonly associated with it. In particular, I argue that it helps us understand why uses of coercion are in general a matter of ethical significance, why state authority depends on commanding a monopoly on the right to use coercion, and why being coerced may reasonably provide one a defense against being held responsible for actions one is coerced into taking. (shrink)

What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.

Potts (2005) and many subsequent works have argued that the semantic content of appositive (non-restrictive) relative clauses, e.g., the underlined material in John, who nearly killed a woman with his car, visited her in the hospital, must be in some way separate from the content of the rest of the sentence, i.e., from at-issue content. At the same time, there is mounting evidence from various anaphoric processes that the two kinds of content must be integrated into a single, incrementally evolving (...) semantic representation. The challenge is how to reconcile this informational separation with these pervasive anaphoric connections. We propose a dynamic semantic account that accomplishes this by taking appositive and at-issue content to involve two different kinds of updates to the Context Set (CS). Treating the context set as a distinguished propositional variable, pcs, we argue that appositives directly impose their content on the CS by eliminating possible values assigned to pcs. In contrast, we treat at-issue assertions as introducing a new propositional dref and proposing that pcs be updated with its content, subject to addressee's response. In addition to capturing the behavior of appositives in discourse, we show that the account can be extended to capture the projection of appositive content past various sentential operators. (shrink)

This commentary uses Paul Gilroy’s controversial claim that new technoscientific processes are instituting an ‘end to race’ as a provocation to discuss the epistemological transformation of race in algorithmic culture. We situate Gilroy’s provocation within the context of an abolitionist agenda against racial-thinking, underscoring the relationship between his post-race polemic and a post-visual discourse. We then discuss the challenges of studying race within regimes of computation, which rely on structures that are, for the most part, opaque; in particular, modes of (...) classification that operate through proxies and abstractions and that figure racialized bodies not as single, coherent subjects, but as shifting clusters of data. We argue that in this new regime, race emerges as an epiphenomenon of processes of classifying and sorting – what we call ‘racial formations as data formations’. This discussion is significant because it raises new theoretical, methodological and political questions for scholars of media and critical algorithmic studies. It asks: how are we supposed to think, to identify and to confront race and racialisation when they vanish into algorithmic systems that are beyond our perception? What becomes of racial formations in post-visual regimes? (shrink)